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)
)
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Case
No.

Defendant-Respondent. )

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from denial of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by plaintiff in connection with his con-

viction for receiving stolen property.

The

plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the
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denial of the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
FA C T S

The State alleged that McMahon,
plaintiff-appellant herein, received
property stolen from Dean Hart of a value
in excess of $50.00 knowing said property
to be stolen.

The evidence at McMahon's

trial consisted of testimony from seven
witnesses:

Dean Hart, owner of the snow-

mobile allegedly stolen; W. J. Hart, Dean's
father, who occupied the house behind
which the snowmobile was stored prior to
the alleged theft; Renald Hastie, one of
the two persons who delivered a snowmobile to John Horne; Robert Mosher, an
Ogden police detective who compared serial
numbers; Richard Petersen, an Ogden police
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detective who interrogated Hastie and
offered to drop charges against him in
return for his testimony against McMahon
in this case; Chris Gosdis, who received
some phone calls; and John Horne, the
owner of a Salt Lake business and "recipient" of the snowmobile who admitted at
the habeas hearing that he perjured himself in a most material way at the criminal
tria 1.
W. J. Hart testified that a certain
Ski-Doo snowmobile owned by his son and
parked behind his residence disappeared on
January 13, 1970.
he

WPS

Hastie testified that

contacted in St. George on January

15th or 16th by McMahon who wanted Hastie
to work for him in connection with stealing
snowmobiles (Case 9328 trial transcript,
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referred to hereafter as T.T. p. 24,26).
Hastie testified he arrived in Ogden on
January 17, 1970, (T.T. p. 28) but he
later changed that story and concluded his
arrival was on January 10, 1970, and a
ticket stub of Dixie Airlines was introduced to somewhat confirm a January 10th
arrival.

Hastie said that some two days

later he was asked by McMahon if he wanted
to deliver a snowmobile (T.T. p. 28) and
Hastie replied in the affirmative.

Hastie

claims that he and McMahon then drove in
separate cars to 42nd and Harrison and that
McMahon "pointed over from the car he was
in to an apartment there in the parking
lot, and the snowmobile was sitting in
the corner of the parking lot."
p. 29)

(T.T.

Hastie then testified that he
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and McMahon drove to a service station and
Hastie "told him we would get them, and he
told me to take them to the L.S.I. Lumber
Company in Salt Lake."

(T.T. p. 29)

Hastie's companion was one Steve Barnes,
who was apparently not interrogated by the
police and did not testify at trial, and
they were driving a car owned by Delane
Bybee.

To further confuse things, Hastie

testified at trial that he was paid $133
by McMahon (T.T. p. 32) while his written
statement (contained in File 9328, Exhibit
2-D) states unequivocally that he received
$250.00.

Also, there is considerable var-

iance regarding whether a check or cash payment was made by Horne, the "purchaser",
to Hastie or his traveling companion.
Horne testified that he had never met
McMahon (T.T. p. 65) and that he had not
5

seen Hastie until the date of delivery
(T.T. p. 65) of the snowmobile.

When asked

about the name of the payee on the check
in payment, Horne testified, "It's Jim
McMahon, I think."

(T.T. p. 67)

He had

previously told the police that payment
was made in cash (T.T. p. 67).

Horne was

ordered to produce his checks and vouchers
for the pertinent period in court at the
beginning of the next trial day.

Horne

arrived the following day with some of his
checks but no check for payment of the
snowmobile.

He then testified as follows:

"Q But you stopped with your
checks on the 15th. Is that your
testimony that you looked through
your checks from the 15th of January to the 30th of January?
A Yes, sir, I did.
Q And what did you find about
a $400 check?
A I have none.
Q Why did you tell me that you
did issue it by check, pay for it
by check?
6

A You had me very much flustered
when I was here yesterday, and I remembered setting down to try to give
them a check for this snowmobile, and
they wouldn't take it. I had to go
get the money for it.
Q You don't know Mr. Hastie?
Do you know Mr. Hastie?
A I do now since yesterday, yes.
Q Did he sit down with you in
your office and refuse to take a check?
A I don't believe Mr. Hastie was
in my office.
Q The other man was, huh?
A Yes.
Q You don't know who was in your
office; do you?
A I don't remember.
Q You don't even remember if they
were in your office; do you?
A Well, they were in my office.
He was in my office.
Q You said: "No, they were not in
my office." Am I confusing you again,
sir, so early in the morning are you
confused now?
MR. STRATFORD: I would submit
this is argumentative and improper,
Your Honor?
THE COURT: Overruled?

Q (By
interested
If I ask a
understand
want time,

Mr. Bingham) I am not
in confusing you, Mr. Horne.
question that you don't
or ask it too fast or you
you tell me before you
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answer; will you please do that for
us?
A Okay.
Q Now, I'm going to ask you
whether or not you paid cash for this
snowmobile?
A I paid cash for the snowmobile.
Q You keep $400 in your business?
A No, sir. I had to go get it.
Q You would remember it pretty
well if you had to go get it; wouldn't
you, if you have to get $400 cash you
would remember that for years; wouldn't
you? If you had to go get $400 to
buy this snowmobile, or something,
wouldn't you remember it?
A Yes.
Q And yet yesterday you said it
was a check because I, Mr. Bingham,
confused you; is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Okay. Where did you go to get
it?
A I went to the bank.
Q Which bank?
A Zions First National.
Q Did you draw it out of a savings
account, or did you get a loan?
A I took it out of a savings
account.
Q Then, your record that the
savings account at Zions First National
Bank will tell us the date exactly
when you got it; wouldn't it?
A Yes, sir.
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Q All we have got to do is go
there and get your savings account
and see the date in January that you
drew $400 out and see exactly the
date that you got it?
A Yes, sir.
Q You are sure those records
will show that you drew out $400?
A Yes."
(T.T. 83-85)
At the habeas corpus hearing, Mr.
Horne changed his "tune" and testified that
the check was made payable to Delane Bybee
and that the book entries supporting that
check were false.

(Habeas transcript,

hereafter H.T. p. 41, et seq.)

Horne testi-

f ied that the check was delivered to Delane

Bybee and that McMahon was not present
(H.T. p. 43) and, in fact, the first time
he had ever seen McMahon was at the first
day of the trial!
The only other testimony implicating
McMahon in any way was the statement of
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Chris Gosdis who stated he was visited by
McMahon in connection with upholstery work
needed by McMahon who said he could not
afford the work done until he had sold his
(T.T. p.92)

Gosdis stated that

he knew Horne was looking for a snowmobile
and that he gave Horne's address and phone
number of McMahon (T.T. p.92).

Gosdis testi-

fied that thereafter he received a phone
call from a "Jim" but he did not identify
the voice as being McMahon's.

(T.T. 93)

McMahon was convicted by the jury
and the late Judge Cowley sentenced him to
a term in prison but took under advisement
his motion for a certificate of probable
cause until another felony charge then pending (Case 9329) was resolved.

Judge Cowley

died shortly thereafter and the matter was
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brought on for hearing before Judge Gould
in connection with sentencing in Case No.
9329.

Upon receiving an adverse ruling

from Judge Gould, McMahon wrote the Supreme
Court seeking assistance in connection with
an appeal but was informed that he was too
late to appeal Cast No. 9328, the one invalved in this habeas corpus proceeding.

A

petition for habeas corpus was filed in the
Third District Court and from an adverse
ruling of that Court, McMahon appeals.
A R G U ME N T

I. THE KNOWING OR RECKLESS USE OF
MATERIAL PERJURED TESTIMONY BY THE PROSECUTION IS A DENIAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW GUARANTEED
TO APPELLANT BY THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
In this case, perjured testimony was
used.

John Horne admitted at the habeas

corpus hearing that he had testified
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falsely at the trial.

At trial he stated

first that a check in payment of the snowmobile was payable to Jim McMahon but later
he recanted and testified that payment was
in such, from his savings account.

Actually,

a check was drawn by Horne payable to
Delane Bybee.

This fact was very material

and, because it was not made known to the
trial jury, McMahon has been convicted.
It should be emphasized that the car
Hastie was driving when the snowmobile was
delivered to Horne was Bybee's car and
now we find that the check was a check to
Bybee and yet Bybee is conspicuous by his
absence from the trial.

Certainly any de-

tective worth his salt would interrogate
Bybee and would exhaustively check Horne's
records and checks to substantiate the payment alleged -- but no evidence of or from

1 ')

Bybee at trial, except for the fragment
that he owned the car.

Now we find out

that he received the check from Horne.
The leading U.S. Supreme Court case
pertaining to the use of perjured testimony
is Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct.
340 (1935).

With reference to the perjured

testimony which was utilized at the trial,
the Court said at page 342:
"It is a requirement that cannot
be deemed to be satisfied by
mere notice and hearing if a
state has contrived a conviction
through the pretense of a trial which
in truth is but used as a means of
depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of
court and jury by the presentation
of testimony known to be perjured.
Such a contrivance by a state to
procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of
justice as is the obtaining of a like
result by intimidation. And the
action of prosecuting officers on

13

behalf of the state, like that of
administrative officers in the
execution of its laws, may constitute state action within the
purview of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The active "knowing" requirement of
the Mooney case, supra, was modified somewhat by the Supreme Court in the case of
Hysler v. State of Florida, 315 U.S. 411,
316 U.S. 642, 62 S.Ct. 688 (1942) in which
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the court,
stated:
"The guides for decision are clear.
If a state, whether by the active
conduct or the connivance of the
prosecution, obtains a conviction
through the use of perjured testimony, it violates civilized standards for the trial of guilt or
innocence and thereby deprives an
accused of liberty without due
process of law." (emphasis added)
See also Giles vs. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,
87 S. Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967); Napue
v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173,
3 L.Ed2d 1217 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355
1 /,

U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9 (1957);
Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 62 S.Ct.
688, 86 L.Ed. 932 (1942); Pyle v. Kansas,
317 U.S. 213, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214
(1942); Evans v. Eyman, 363 F.2d 540, 542
(9th Cir. 1966).
In the recent case of Imbler v.
Craven, 298 F.Supp. 795 (C.D. Calif. 1969)
affirmed, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970) cert.
denied 39 L.W. 3167, the District Judge,
in a very able and well-reasoned opinion,
held that a state defendant's right to due
process of law was violated where the prosecution permitted a witness to give material testimony which the prosecutor knew
or should have known was false.

With regard

to the contention of the state that knowledge
of the falsity of the evidence on the part
15

of the prosecution is a requisite for
relief in the case of perjured testimony, the
court stated at page 804:
argues that another
element of this rule also prevents its application to the
instant case: knowledge of the
falsity of such evidence on the
part of the prosecution. Respondent does not seriously dispute the falsity of Costello's
statements. Instead, it is
argued that the prosecution, in
effect, acted in good faith and
without knowledge that such testimony was false. Lacking such
knowledge, the state contends it
cannot be responsible for any perjured testimony. This court does
not agree.
"It should be noted at this
point that while it is true that
the Supreme Court cases have as
yet discussed only the "knowing"
use of perjured testimony, there
is authority for the proposition
that one convicted on the basis
of perjured testimony has been
deprived of due process even
when the prosecution was unaware
of the perjury. In Jones v.
Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir.
1938) it was held that a state is
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constitutionally required to
provide a corrective remedy upon
discovery of the perjury, and,
absent such a remedy, federal
habeas relief will be granted.
There the state courts held they
lacked jurisdiction to grant the
relief sought. The prosecutor did
not know at the time of the trial
that the testimony was false, and
there was no suggestion that he
should have known . .
"The position that a criminal
conviction founded in part upon
perjured testimony cannot be constitutionally permitted to stand,
whether such perjury is discovered
prior to or subsequent to trial,
is therefore not without authority.
The prejudice resulting to the
defendant so convicted is not
eliminated by the state's ignorance. Nor can it seriously be
contended that there is absent
any "state action", necessary to
invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection in the procuring of a
state criminal conviction."
(emphasis added)
With regard to the actions of the prosecutor in that case, the court noted at
pages 807-8:
"The reckless use of highly sus-
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picious false testimony is no less
damaging or culpable than the knowing use of false testimony, and a conviction based upon such evidence must
suffer the same consequence.
"Therefore, as to each of the six
items of false testimony described
above, the court finds that the prosecutor had knowledge of such falsity,
or, if he did not have actual knowledge, that he had reason to believe
such testimony was false and his
reckless use thereof in disregard of
such reason is to be treated the
same as knowing use of false testimony."
The use of perjured testimony, either
knowingly or negligently, is analogous to
the withholding of material evidence favorable to a defendant.

The well recognized

rule in the case of withholding of material
evidence is that a conviction is not allowed
to stand where the prosecutor has, either
wilfully or negligently withheld material
evidence which is favorable to the defendant.

Thomas v. U.S., 343 F.2d 49, 53-54

(9th Cir.1965) U.S. v. Zbrowski, 271 F.2d
18

661, 668 (2nd Cir. 1959).
The instant case is distinguishable
from the case of Ward v. Turner, 12 Utah

2d 310, 366 P.2d 72 (1961), in which the
prosecutor had advised the doctor who
examined the assaulted woman that he should
only mention sodomy if expressly asked about
it and "without perjury".

In the instant

case, the false testimony of Horne should
have been immediately apparent to the prosecutor because of the various statements
regarding payment for the snowmobile.
The detectives investigating the
alleged crime must certainly have interrogated Horne regarding the method of payment and who was paid.

The use of the

perjured testimony of Horne by the prosecutor was certainly known to the police
detectives and accordingly, their knowledge
of the untruth of the statements is charge-
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able to the prosecution and would come
within the rule of Imbler, supra, and
Mooney, supra.

See e.g. People v. Steele,

65 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. 1946) and Boyce,
Suppressed and Perjured Evidence, a Denial
of Due Process, 5 Utah L.Rev. 92, 96 (1956).
It is submitted that the perjured
testimony in this case was so material and
blatant that use of it was either known by
the prosecutor or else he and the police
detectives were so remiss in their investigation and preparation for trial that use of
the perjured testimony was reckless and a
violation of McMahon's constitutional rights.
Imbler v. Craven, supra.
Contrary to the conclusion of the
lower court in its opinion denying the
habeas corpus petition, the perjured testi-
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many did constitute a manifest injustice.
The result would have been considerably different if Horne had testified truthfully.
He would then have stated that the check
was payable to Bybee (H.T. p. 41) and it
was given to Bybee (H.T. p.43) and McMahon
was not present or involved in any way
(H.T. p.43).

This, along with the testi-

many that Hastie was driving Bybee's car
would certainly make for a strong case
against Bybee and would serve as a reasonable hypothesis for the Bybee-Hastie involvement and the non-involvement of McMahon.
II ABSENT THE PERJURED TESTIMONY
THERE IS NO CORROBORATION OF THE ACCOMPLICE
TESTIMONY AND TilE CASE AGAINST McMAHON
MUST FAIL.
Although this is an appeal argument,
it is also one which should properly be
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considered by the court in connection
with this proceeding because it was dealt
with at length by the lower court and
further shows the unfairness of the trial
here attacked.
The questions to be considered
are (1) whether Hastie was an accomplice
and (2) whether there was any corroborative
evidence within the scope of the Utah statute.
77-31-18.
In the case of State v. Fertig, 233
P.2d 347 (Utah 1951) Justice Wolfe stated
at p. 349:
"Generally, an accomplice is one
who aids and abets. An abettor
advises, instigates, encourages
or assists the actual perpetrator.
"An accomplice is a person who
knowingly, voluntarily, and with
common intent with the principal
offender, unites in the commission
of the crime.""
22

The case of State v. Davie, 240 P.2d
263 (Utah 1952) noted that there is no
statutory definition of accomplice in Utah
hut that the term has been construed to
mean one who could be charged as a principal
with the one on trial.

See also State v.

Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465
(1964) in which the salutary rationale for
the accomplice rule is enunciated.
In this case, McMahon was charged with
receiving stolen property.

Hastie was

certainly involved with the very same
offense but a deal was made with him and
charges were dropped in exchange for his
testimony against McMahon.

Based upon

Hastie's own testimony, he was guilty of
the same crime with which McMahon was
charged.

The lower court has taken the

position that the crimes are different
and the "receipt" by McMahon had come to
23

rest prior to Hastie entering the picture.
There is no evidence of a prior "receipt"
by McMahon but only testimony that he

pointed to a parking lot in which there
was a snowmobile.

And this pointing was

apparently not accompanied by verbalization
because there is no testimony to that effect.
(T.T. p. 29)

It is completely possible

that the snowmobile was seen there by McMahon and Hastie for the first time and
that there was simultaneous "receipt" by
both.

The record is completely devoid of

evidence that the snowmobile in that lot at
that time was stolen nor is there any
evidence that that machine was the one
stolen from Hart, nor is there any evidence
that the machine in the parking lot was
•
d to t h e
t h e one delivere
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II

•
II
perjurer
a nd

subsequently examined for a serial number.
In fact, it is completely possible that
Horne's activities included the buying and
selling of many snowmobiles of questionable
origin.
In any event, the crime of which
Hastie was charged is the same as that of
McMahon and there is no evidence which would
make him an accessory after the fact as
indicated by the lower court (R.32)
In the case of State v. Helmenstein,
163 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1968) the court held
that any witness who aided and abetted the
perpetrator, in any way, either directly
or indirectly, by acts or by gestures is
an accomplice and the rule then applies
that testimony of that accomplice must be
corroborated.

North Dakota has a similar

statute to the Utah provision applicable

25

here.

See also King v. State, 120 S.W.2d

590 (Texas 1938) Annotation, 19 A.L.R.2d
1352.
There was no competent evidence to
"tend to connect" McMahon to conunission of
the crime charged.

Gosdis testified that

he had told McMahon that Horne was in the
market for a snowmobile but there is no
showing that McMahon followed up with Horne
or that Gosdis was again contacted, except
for a phone call from "Jim", clearly not
competent evidence and hearsay.

The lower

court has attempted to connect McMahon to
the crime by a telephone number given to
Gosdis (R-31).

If such a tenuous thread

can be used to connect one to a crime
then we must all beware of giving our
phone number to anyone.

Such a fragment

of evidence does not "tend to connect the
26

defendant with the commission of the
crime."

The crime is "receiving stolen

property" not the giving of one's phone
number.
In the case of State v. Vigil, 260
P.2d 539 (Utah 1953) this court stated
that the corroborating evidence must do more
than cast a grave suspicion on the defendant and it must connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense charged.
See also State v. Erwin, 101 U. 365, 120
P.2d 285; State v. Lay, 38 U.143, 110 P. 986;
State v. Butterfield, 70 U.529, 261 P.804.
It would appear to the writer that
the only connection to be made is Hastie
and Bybee and there is no other evidence
''which in itself and without the aid of
the testimony of the accomplice tends to
connect the defendant with the commission
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of the offense . .

" . There is no

evidence that McMahon (1) received (2)
Property of a value in excess of $50.00
which was stolen, (3) knowing it to be
stolen.
III. PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO AN APPEAL OF HIS CONVICTION WAS
VIOLATED.
McMahon was tried on April 8th and
9th, 1970.

On April 27, 1970, he came

before the court for sentencing and prior
to pronouncement of sentence the following
took place:
"Judge Cowley: Do you have anything
you want to say"
McMahon: Not really, except I
want to appeal the case, of course.
Judge Cowley: Well, you haven't
had any word, I guess, from the Parole
Board?
(See R. p.21 et seq.)
The Court went on to discuss the matter of
another pending case and the possibility of
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an appeal bond.

After pronouncing sen-

tence, the court remanded McMahon to the
county jail until the ether matter was
disposed of and postponed decision on an
appeal bond until the other case was tried
and disposed of.
The lower court, in reviewing the contentions of petitioner held that the entry
of judgment was April 28, 1970, the date
of the appearance before Judge Cowley referred to above, and that no notice of
appeal was filed within a month thereafter
pursuant to the requirements of Section 77Appellant contends that the sentence
was stayed by the ruling of Judge Cowley
that he would rule on certain matters after
disposal of the other pending case and, in
the alternative, that notice of appeal
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was given within the time required by
statute.
Judge Cowley left certain matters in
abeyance at the time of the April 28th
hearing.

He remanded McMahon to the county

jail instead of the State Prison and he
took under advisement the request by McMahon 1 f
counsel for an appeal bond.

Because these

matters were left pending until after his
pending trial, appellant was certainly justified in thinking there was no final judgment
from which an appeal could be taken.
Section 77-39-6 provides that an
appeal is taken by "filing with the clerk
of the court
appeal

. a notice stating the
and serving a copy upon the

adverse party . . . "

Certainly notice

was given by McMahon to the court and the
clerk present at the time of sentence was
30

aware of his intent to appeal and notice
was likewise given to the prosecutor.

The

only question is then whether such notice
must be written.

The statute does not

specifically require written notice.

See,

e.g. Wells-Grinnan M.A.B. v. Belton, 293
S.W.2d 70 (Texas 1956) in which oral notice
of appeal held sufficient.

It is submitted

that all parties concerned were given
notice of the appeal by McMahon and the
transcript plainly shows such an appeal.
To rule that McMahon did not appeal because
of an implied requirement that the notice
be written is to deny him rights accorded
by the constitutions of the United States
and Utah.
The case of Roberson v. Draney, 54
U.525, 182 P.212 (1919) ruled that appeals
were to be liberally construed.
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This

court stated at p. 213:
to this court being
guaranteed by the Constitution,
the proceedings relating thereto,
in case the jurisdictional steps
have been taken, must be liberally
construed so as to effectuate the
exercise of the right rather than
to fritter it away by a strict
construction."
See also Horsley v. Simpson, 400 F.2d 708
(5th Cir. 1968).
CONCLUSION
The conviction of petitioner was
tainted by the perjured testimony which
was material to the conviction.

If the

true story had been told the Hastie-Bybee
link would undoubtedly have been made by
the jury.

The prosecutor and the police

acted recklessly in allowing use of the
perjured testimony which is tanamount to
a "knowing" use of such false testimony.
The testimony of the accomplice was allowed
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for conviction without sufficient carroboration.

Also, the appeal of petitioner

was dismissed although notice thereof was
given the court, the clerk and opposing
counsel within the requirements of Utah law.
The denial of the petition for writ
of habeas corpus should be reversed and the
writ ordered granted.

Robert M.
Attorney for Appellant
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
I hereby certify that I mailed a
copy of the foregoing to Honorable Vernon
B. Romney, Attorney General; David S. Young,
Assistant Attorney General, State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah; and to
James McMahon, P. O. Box 250, Draper, Utah,
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this 16th
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